Executive Summary
THREAT
- Threat actors are developing automated softwares which abuse OTP generating endpoints to send heaps of otp messages.
- These softwares abuse the publicly available OTP APIs and hold the power to cause targeted outages of telecommunication services.
- Incase of an account takeover scenario a threat actor could spam such sms which may lead to “MFA fatigue” or “exhaustion” attacks.
IMPACT
- This abuse can lead up to higher than expected costs of maintaining the OTP based API.
- Potential clients could develop a negative sentiment against the company.
- Operations could be negatively affected due to inaccessibility of telecommunication services.
MITIGATION
- Implement captcha based service to limit the bot based usage.
- Implement rate limiting at the endpoint.
- Monitor github repositories for mentions of your API in source code of such tools.
Note: This would cause disruption of services on the mobile device essentially creating a scenario that the device is under a DOS attack. Further in a scenario while the attack is going on, if the user tries to clear the notifications manually they might accidently click on a MFA prompt thus granting access to the attacker. This attack could also be used as a veil to hide illegitimate login attempts made by the threat actors to gain access to the users device. This also implies that while the attack is going on the user may miss out on critical notifications.
Analysis and Attribution
- CloudSEK’s contextual AI digital risk platform XVigil discovered multiple github repositories with mentions of Indian companies and their APIs.
- These APIs allow anyone to send unlimited OTP SMSes to any number without any rate limiting or CAPTCHA protection, which leads to abuse of these APIs by automated tools.
- This results in increased API cost and legal repercussions for the brand along with decline in brand’s public image.
The affected companies and their exposed APIs (region wise) -
Note - These graphs are based on APIs found and collated from the source code of multiple sms bombing tools, some of which are archived now. Cloudsek researchers refrained from testing these APIs for their current vulnerability status.
Attack chain
Collecting Target Phone Numbers: The user of the SMS bomber provides the target phone number or a list of phone numbers to which they want to send the messages. This information can be input manually or imported from a file.
This depends on the motivation of the threat actor, for a prank, only the friend’s number would be used, but for a dedicated attack the phone numbers of representatives of the sales department could be collected from the “lead sellers” from dark web forums or even from linkedin or scribd.
These numbers are then passed into the software which makes continued multiple requests at the target APIs and the attack starts.
Attack chain (Contd)
Continuous Operation: The tool will continue sending messages until a preset limit is reached or until the user decides to stop the operation manually. This can result in a flood of messages and/or calls being sent to the target phone number.
Impact on the Target: The constant influx of messages and calls can overwhelm the target's device, potentially causing it to slow down, freeze, or even crash. Additionally, the target may be constantly alerted with notifications, making it difficult to use the device for other tasks.
As in the case of Uber hack, this could also lead to “MFA fatigue” or “exhaustion” attacks
Finally, the inbox of the receiver could get filled which blocks him from receiving new and potentially important messages.
In our example, the sales operation of the targeted company could shut down entirely because of the constant bombardment of sms and calls.
Legal repercussions - Bombarding a phone with SMSes even after it activates the DND service is not just a form of harassment and nuisance (IPC Section 268), but “a trap, bait, and a criminal act of theft, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property under IPC Sections 378 & 420,” said Bombay High Court lawyer Satya Mulay. ( reference )
Accessibility and finances of such services -
- Multiple such tools are hosted online which allow anyone to launch such campaigns very easily without any installation.
- Additionally all these tools are free because the major chunk of cost is taken up by the sms sending APIs which are owned by the brands.
- One such OTP sms could cost up to 20 paisa for a brand.
- These tools run on the revenue generated by serving ads on their platform.
Mitigation
Scripts
- https://github.com/bhattsameer/Bombers/tree/master
- https://github.com/TheSpeedX/TBomb
- https://github.com/iMro0t/bomb3r
- https://github.com/ebankoff/Beast_Bomber
- https://github.com/anubhavanonymous/XLR8_BOMBER
- https://github.com/Priyans0830m/DDOS-BOMBER/tree/main
- https://github.com/LimerBoy/Impulse/blob/master/tools/SMS/services.json
References
- #Traffic Light Protocol - Wikipedia
- https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-technology/sms-bombing-what-is-it-and-how-to-stay-safe-8050074/
- https://www.financialexpress.com/life/technology-cybersecurity-sms-bombing-can-disrupt-the-working-of-your-phone-2612604/#:~:text=Bombarding%20a%20phone,lawyer%20Satya%20Mulay