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Executive Summary
This report presents a comprehensive analysis of a security incident involving The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). The incident concerns the unauthorized sale of direct root access to the database, compromising 290K+ user records, all valued at $500.
CloudSEK’s STRIKE Team has been actively monitoring this incident. Our investigation delves into the potential attack vectors exploited by the Threat Actor to gain unauthorized access to this data. By analyzing possible entry points, misconfigurations, and security lapses, we aim to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to this breach.
Analysis and Attribution
Information from the Post
On 10th April, 2025 CloudSEK’s contextual AI digital risk platform XVigil discovered a threat actor by the name pirates_gold claiming to sell the data dump and direct root access of BWSSB’s database.
The initial post by the threat actor specified a payable amount of $500 for access to the compromised BWSSB database. However, upon direct engagement, the actor demonstrated a high level of urgency and appeared willing to negotiate significantly lower prices, indicating a potential desperation to sell.
The post claimed that the database access would expose records of 291,212 users. It was explicitly stated that the compromised data did not include the user's passwords. Additionally, the post featured a few lines of sample data.
Screenshot of the post made by the threat actor
Technical Analysis and Potential IAV (Initial Access Vector)
CloudSEK’s researchers conducted a detailed examination of the threat actor’s post, which included a reference to the subdomain owc.bwssb.gov.in, used as an application portal for water connection.
Subsequent reconnaissance of the subdomain revealed the presence of an exposed endpoint that corresponds to Adminer, a widely used, database management tool which provides a web-based interface for performing administrative operations on various database management systems.
Engagement with the threat actor further validated the significance of the identified endpoint. During the interaction, the actor confirmed that the endpoint was actively being used to obtain direct root-level access to the underlying database.
Screenshot of the engagement with the threat actor
Further analysis of the subdomain uncovered the presence of an exposed .env file. In this instance, the file contained plaintext credentials associated with the MySQL database. Upon verification, the credentials were found to be valid. Furthermore, an exclusive sample shared by the threat actor indicated that he was using the same username found in the .env file to log in.
The availability of these credentials, in conjunction with the exposed adminer.php interface, would allow the threat actor to achieve full access to the database.
Based on the available intelligence and corroborating evidence, we can conclude with high confidence that the threat actor gained unauthorized access to the BWSSB database comprising over 290,000+ user records by leveraging valid database credentials exposed within a publicly accessible .env file.
Please Note - At the time of writing this report, the .env file was no longer accessible, and the previously exposed credentials had been rendered invalid. However, the threat actor claimed to retain access via a backdoor. CloudSEK has not independently verified this claim.
Threat Actor Profile - pirates_gold
The threat actor operating under the alias pirates_gold has been identified as the individual responsible for advertising access to the compromised BWSSB database. Analysis of underground forum activity indicates that pirates_gold joined BreachForums in September 2024 and has since established a moderate presence within the community.
As of the time of reporting, the actor holds a reputation score of 60 and has authored over 39 posts suggesting active involvement in data trade, illicit access sales, or related cybercriminal activities.
Previous Organisations Targeted:
- Auxxxreviews
- Vision Brindes
- AC Online
- ISTV.uz
- Farmacia Internacional
- U-F-L.net
- Bank Syariah AlSalaam
Targeted Regions and Sectors:
Primarily motivated by financial gains, the threat actor group generally targets the following sectors :
- E-Commerce
- Healthcare
- Finance
- Financial Services
- Adult
Modus Operandi
The particular threat actor employs a multi-faceted approach to compromise targets and profit from stolen data:
- Data Breaches: Exploits vulnerabilities and misconfigurations to gain unauthorized access to organizational databases.
- Access Brokerage: Sells root-level database access and other compromised accounts.
- Data Dump Sales: Monetizes breaches by selling stolen data dumps on underground forums.
Incident Impact and Severity
- Complete Administrative Access: Logging in with the exposed credentials provided the threat actor with root-level privileges, enabling complete administrative control over the database.
- Infrastructure Sabotage and Data Manipulation: Root-level access enables modification or deletion of critical operational data, such as payment records or grievance logs. This could disrupt essential public services, erode public trust, and hinder administrative functions within BWSSB.
- Extensive Data Exposure: The database contains multiple tables including:
- Payment Data
- Application Data
- Grievance Data
- System Logs
- PII Compromise: The application table alone holds over 290,000+ records containing sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), including: Full Name, Phone Number, Complete Address, Email ID, Aadhaar Number and other critical applicant details.
- Targeted Phishing and Social Engineering Campaigns: The compromised data can fuel highly targeted phishing attacks against citizens and employees. Detailed PII enhances the credibility of fraudulent communication, increasing the likelihood of successful exploitation.
Recommendations
- Conduct a Comprehensive Security Audit: Perform an in-depth audit of the affected infrastructure, to identify and remediate any remaining vulnerabilities or backdoors that may persist post-incident.
- Revoke All Exposed and Potentially Compromised Credentials: Ensure that all database and application credentials—especially those previously stored in the .env file—are rotated. Implement strict secret management practices to prevent future credential exposure.
- Remove Public Access to Administrative Interfaces: Immediately restrict access to sensitive administrative endpoints such as adminer.php through IP whitelisting, VPN access, or complete removal from the public domain.