Author: Syed Shahrukh Ahmed

In the recent past, several security vulnerabilities have been discovered, in widely used software products. Since these products are installed on a significant number of devices, connected to the internet, it entices threat actors to develop botnets, steal sensitive data, and more.

In this article we explore:

• Vulnerabilities detected in some popular products.
• Target identification and exploitation techniques employed by intrusive threat actors.
• Threat actors’ course of action in the event of identifying a flaw in widely used internet products/technology.

Popular Target Vulnerabilities and their Exploitation

 Ghostcat: Apache Tomcat Vulnerability

All Apache Tomcat Server versions are vulnerable to Local File Inclusion and Potential RCE. The issue resides in the AJP protocol, which is an optimised version of the HTTP protocol. The years old vulnerability is vulnerable because of the component which handled a request attribute improperly. The AJP protocol, enabled by default, listens on TCP port 8009. Multiple scanners, exploit scripts, honeypots surfaced in a matter of days after the original disclosure by Apache.

Stats published by researchers indicate a large number of affected systems, the numbers being much greater than originally predicted.

Citrix ADC, Citrix Gateway RCE, Directory Traversal

Recently, Directory Traversal and RCE vulnerabilities, in Citrix ADC and Gateway products, affected at least 80,000 systems. Shortly after the disclosure, multiple entities (ProjectZeroIndia, TrustedSec) released PoC scripts publicly that engendered a slew of exploit attempts, from multiple actors in the wild.

Jira Sensitive Data Exposure

 A few months ago, researchers found Jira Instances leaking sensitive information such as names, roles, email IDs of employees. Additionally, internal project details, such as milestones, current projects, owner and subscriber details, etc., were also accessible to anyone making a request to the following unauthenticated JIRA endpoints:

https://jirahost/secure/popups/UserPickerBrowser.jspa

https://jirahost/secure/ManageFilters.jspa?filterView=popular

https://jirahost/secure/ConfigurePortalPages!default.jspa?view=popular

Avinash Jain, from Grofers, tested the vulnerability on multiple targets, and discovered a large number of vulnerable Jira instances, revealing sensitive data belonging to various companies, such as NASA, Google and Yahoo, and its employees.

 Spring Boot Data Leakage via Actuators

Spring Boot is an open source Java-based MVC framework. It enables developers to quickly set up routes to serve data over HTTP. Most apps using the Spring MVC framework now also use the Boot utility. Boot helps developers to configure what components to add, and also to setup the Framework faster.

An added feature of the tool called Actuator, enables developers to monitor and manage their applications/REST API, by storing and serving request dumps, metrics, audit details, and environment settings.

In the event of a misconfiguration, these Actuators could be a back door to the servers, making exposed applications susceptible to breaches. The misconfiguration in Spring Boot Versions 1 to 1.4 granted access to Actuator endpoints without authentication. Although later versions secure these endpoints by default, and allow access only after authentication, developers still tend to ignore the misconfiguration before deploying the application.

The following actuator endpoints leak sensitive data:

There are other such defective Actuator endpoints, that provide sensitive information to:

• Gain system information
• Send requests as authenticated users (by leveraging session values obtained from the request dumps)
• Execute critical commands, etc.

Webmin RCE via backdoored functionality

Webmin is a popular web-based system configuration tool. A zero-day pre-auth RCE vulnerability, affects some of its versions, between 1.882 and 1.921. This vulnerability enables the remote password change functionality. The Webmin code repository on SourceForge was backdoored with malicious code allowing remote command execution (RCE) capability on an affected endpoint.

The attacker sends his commands piped with Password Change parameters through `password_change.cgi` on the vulnerable host running Webmin. And if the Webmin app is hosted with root privileges, the adversary can execute malicious commands as an administrator.

Why do threat actors exploit vulnerabilities?

1. Breach user/company data: Data exfiltration of Sensitive/PII data
2. Computing power: Infecting systems to mine Cryptocurrency, serve malicious files
3. Botnets, serving malicious files: Exploits targeted at adding more bots to a larger botnet
4. Service disruption and eventually Ransom: Locking users out of the devices
5. Political reasons, cyber war, angry user, etc.

How do adversaries exploit vulnerabilities?

On disclosure of such vulnerabilities, adversaries probe the internet for technical details and exploit codes, to launch attacks. Rand corporation’s research and analysis on zero-day vulnerabilities states that, after a vulnerability disclosure, it takes 6 to 37  days and a median of 22 days to develop a fully functional exploit. But when an exploit disclosure comes with a patch, developers and administrators immediately patch the vulnerable software. Auto update, regular security updates, large scale coverage of such disclosures help to contain attacks. However, several systems run the unpatched versions of a software or application and become easy targets for such attacks.

Steps involved in vulnerability exploitation

Once a bad actor decides to exploit a vulnerability they have to:

• Obtain a working exploit or develop an exploit (in case of a zero-day vulnerability)
• Utilize Proof of Concept (PoC) attached to a bug report (in case of a bug disclosure)
• Identify as many hosts as possible that are vulnerable to the exploit
• Maximise the number of targets to maximise profits.

Target Hunting

Even though the respective vendors patch vulnerabilities reported, upon searching GitHub or specific CVEs on ExploitDB, we can find PoC scripts for the issues. Usually PoC scripts require a host/ URL as an input and it measures the success of the exploit/ examination.

Adversaries identify a vulnerable host through their signatures/ behaviour, to generate a list of exploitable hosts. The following components possess signatures that determine whether a host is vulnerable or not:

• Port
• Path
• Subdomain
• Indexed Content/ URL

Port

Many commonly used software has a specific default installation port(s). If a port is not configured, the software installs on a pre-set port. And in most cases a software installs on the default port. For example, most systems use default port 3306 to install MySQL and port 9200 for Elasticsearch. So, by curating a list of all servers with an open 9200 port, a threat actor can determine systems running the Elasticsearch. However, port 9200 can be used to install other services/ software as well.

Using port scans to discover targets to exploit the Webmin RCE vulnerabilities

• Determining that the default port where Webmin listens to after installation is Port 10000.
• Get a working PoC for the Webmin exploit.
• Execute a port scan on all hosts connected to the internet for port 10000.
• This will lead to a discovery of all possible Webmin installations that could be vulnerable to the exploit.

In addition, tools like Shodan make port-based target discovery effortless. At the same time, if Shodan does not index the target port, attackers leverage tools like MassScan, Zenmap and run an internet-wide scan. The latter approach hardly takes a day if the attacker has enough resources.

Similarly, an attacker in search of an easy way to find a list of systems affected by Ghostcat, will port scan all the target IPs and narrow down on machines with port 8009 open.

Path

Software/ services are commonly installed on a distinct default path. Thus, the software can be fingerprinted by observing the signature path. For instance, WordPress installations can be identified if the path ‘wp-login.php’ is detected on the server. This facilitates locating the service as it accesses a web browser.

For example, when phpmyadmin utility is installed, by default it installs on the path ‘/phpmyadmin’. A user can access the utility through this path. In this case, a port scan won’t help, because this utility doesn’t install on a specific port.

Using distinct paths to discover targets to exploit Spring Boot Data Leakage

• Gather a list of hosts that run Spring Boot. Since the default Spring Boot applications start on port 8080, it would help to have a list of hosts that have this port open. This allows threat actors to see a pattern.
• Hit specific endpoints like ‘/trace’, ‘/env’ on the hosts and check the response for sensitive content.

Web path scanners and web fuzzer tools such as Dirsearch or Ffuf facilitate this process.

Though responses may include false positives, actors can use techniques, such as signature matching or static rule check, to constrict the list of vulnerable hosts. As this method operates with HTTP requests and responses, the process can be much slower than mass scale port scans. Shodan can also fetch hosts based on http responses, from its index.

Subdomain

Software are commonly installed on a specific subdomain since is an easier, standard, and convenient way to operate the software.

For example, Jira is commonly found on a subdomain as in ‘jira.domain.com’ or ‘bug-jira.domain.com’. Even though there are no rules when it comes to subdomains, adversaries can identify certain patterns. Similar services, usually installed on a subdomain, are Gitlab, Ftp, Webmail, Redmine, Jenkins, etc.

Security Trails, Circl.lu, Rapid7 Open Data hold passive DNS records. Other scanners that maintain such records would be sites such as Crt.sh and Censys. They collect SSL certificate records regularly and have an add-on feature that supports queries.

Indexed Content/Url

The content published by services is generally unique. If we employ search engines such as Google, to find pages based on particular signatures, serving specific content, the results will have a list of URLs running a particular service. This is one of the most common techniques to hunt down targets, easily.
It is commonly known as ‘Google Dorking’. For instance, adversaries can quickly curate a short list of all cPanel login pages. For which, they could use the following Dork in Google Search: “site:cpanel.*.* intitle:”login” -site:forums.cpanel.net”. The Google Hacking database contains numerous such Dorks and after understanding the search mechanism, it is easy to write such search queries.

Observations

There have been multiple honey pot experiments to study the mass scale exploration and exploitation in the wild. Setting up honey pots is not only a good way of understanding the attack patterns, it also serves in identifying malicious actors out there, trying to exploit systems in the wild. These identified IPs/ Network trying to enumerate targets or exploit vulnerable systems end up in various public blacklists. Various research attempts have set up diverse honeypots and studied the techniques used to gain access. Most attempts are to gain access via default credentials, and originated mainly from blacklisted IP addresses.

Another interesting observation is that, most honeypot detected traffic, seems to originate from China. It is also very common to see honeypots specific to a zero-day surface on Github as soon after a the release of an exploit. The Citrix ADC vulnerability (CVE-2019-19781) also saw a few honeypots being published on Github within a short time after the first exploit PoC was released.

Research carried out by Sophos highlights the high rate of activity on exposed targets using honeypots. As reported in the research paper, it took from less than a minute to 2 hours for the first attack on the exposed target. Therefore, if an accidental misconfiguration leaves a system exposed to the internet, for even a short period of time, it should not be assumed that the system was not exploited.